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" I  should like to em phasise the im portance of 
organising life in accordance with the P rincip le  of 
E conom y and to add that if we would dim inish the 
incidence o f  ev il we m ust subordinate human a ctiv i­
ties to control by this P rin cip le . If we would do this 
and halt the current pseudo-orthogenetic drift toward 
internal struggle and disunity, we m ust bring human 
activities much m ore under the em pire o f an unfettered 
price  system " -
Joseph J.Spengler
That the econom ic growth that has taken place in South A fr ica  
since the diamond and gold "ex p los ion " o f the 187 0 's and 1880's and, 
particu larly , since the establishm ent of the Union in 1910 has been 
sustained and prodigious is not in doubt -  though there has been an 
obstinate and not insignificant slowing down in the rate o f econom ic 
activity in the last five years or so, about which m ore w ill be said 
presently .
B y way of illustration , som e of the principal growth indices 
over the fifty years or so since Union are sum m arised in Appendix I.
However im pressive these figures m ay appear, it m ust be 
rem em bered  that they are aggregates and, as such, can te ll us v ery  
little o f the structural changes and the dynam ic fo r ce s , both econ om ic 
and otherw ise, underlying the broad expansionist tendencies. It is 
p re c ise ly  because of the m anifold influences at work in the p rocess  
o f econom ic advancement in our society  that I have felt im pelled to 
cast the title o f this paper as widely as I have done. Perhaps, too, 
there is an elem ent of se lf-d e fen ce  here, in advance, against the 
charge som etim es p re ferred  by anthropologists and soc io log ists  
that econom ists do not take adequate account o f  "s o c ia l"  or "institu ­
tional" or "cu ltu ra l" factors in the study o f econ om ic growth -  even
(1) "National G oals, Growth, and the P rincip le  o f E conom y", in 
Goals for  A m ericans (The Third Duke A m erican  A ssem bly , 
Durham, N. C . 1961), p. 24.
2i f  I find it d ifficult to concede the point.
But what I do concede at once is that I am taking it for  granted 
in the ensuing d iscussion  that econom ic growth, in the form  of higher 
per capita rea l incom es, is generally desired  in South A fr ica . This 
is a very  large assum ption, but I believe it to be consistent with the 
aspirations of all the m ajor groups in our society . I would go further, 
and say that the growth and diffusion of the desire  for a com m on 
minimum standard o f living is an outstanding feature of the post-w ar 
w orld . In a sense, for perhaps the first time in the h istory  of the 
m odern w orld, a universal goal is gradually evolving. Even in cultures 
traditionally based on an ideologica l system  that stresses  oth er­
w orld liness, the desire  for change in this world seem s to be constant­
ly  in creasing . And the desire  for such change has itse lf becom e a 
spiritual fo rce  of great im portance in those regions of the w orld.
(1) I believe it is fa ir to say of econom ists, in general, that they have 
exp licitly  recognised the im portance and relevance of what are 
som etim es called the "n o n -e co n o m ic"  factors in econom ic, d eve­
lopm ent, both fo r  em pirica l and theoretical research  and fo r  
policy-m aking purposes. One can sca rce ly  accuse Duesenberry, 
or Spengler, or  Kuznets, or Hagen or H irschm an of failing to 
appreciate that, for exam ple, entrepreneurship, technological 
innovation, capital form ation, labour transfers o r  the organisation 
o f production and distribution depend upon and interact with a 
com plex  socia l m atrix. (See e .g .  James S. Duesenberry, "Som e 
A spects o f the Theory o f E conom ic D evelopm ent", Explorations 
in E ntrepreneurial H istory, III (1950), 63-102;Joseph J.Spengler, 
"T heory , Ideology, N on-E conom ic Values, and P o litico -E con om ic  
Developm ent, "T radition , Values and S ocio -E con om ic Developm ent 
(Duke U niversity P ress , 1961), l~56;Sim on Kuznets, "Tow ard a 
Theory o f E conom ic Growth, "  National P o licy  for  E conom ic W el- 
fare at Home and A broad, ed. R . Lekachman (Garden City, U.S.A. 
1955); E verett E. Hagen, "The P rocess  of E conom ic D evelopm ent", 
E conom ic Development and Cultural Change, V (1957), 193-215;
A .O .H irsch m an , The Strategy of E conom ic Development, (Yale,
New Haven, 1958. j
(2) On this, see W ilbert E. M oore. "C reation  of a Common Culture, " 
Confluence, IV (1955), p. 229; and W ilbert E. M oore and Arnold S. 
Feldm an, eds ., Labour Commitment and Social Change in D eve- 
loping A reas (Social Science R esearch  Council, 1962), notably 
C h s .i and iv. Joseph J. Spengler, (op. cit) arguing that a m inim um  
value consensus is a log ica l necessity  o f a viable socia l order, 
points out that com m on values m ay be given sp ecific  ideologica l 
explication  and thus serve as d irect incentives to appropriate action.
3Although it m ay not be possib le  to state in detail the sp ecific  
content o f the goal of econ om ic developm ent, it undoubtedly includes 
a certain  m inim um  econom ic standard, particu larly  in regard to the 
m aterial conditions of l ife . This being so, the type o f change required 
is to a considerable extent (though by no m eans, entirely , o f cou rse) 
change in so c io -e co n o m ic  institutions.
To understand the possib ilities  o f such change in this country, 
or the extent to which it m ay in fact be taking p lace , with all that that 
im plies fo r  the different classes  o f its population, it is  n ecessa ry  to 
know something o f the essentia l dualism  of our socia l and econom ic 
o rd er . It is m y subm ission  that what m ay be wrong about som e cu r ­
rent prescrip tion s for  raising living standards in this country stem s 
from  a faulty or insufficient appreciation  o f the dual character o f the 
e conom y.
This ch aracteristic  of many o f the w orld 's  under-developed or 
developing countries is m uch in evidence in current studies o f e con o ­
m ic  growth. It is described  by H irschm an as "the prolonged c o ­
existence and cohabitation o f m odern industry and of p re-industria l, 
som etim es neolith ic tech n iqu es."  (*) The notion itse lf originated 
with a Netherlands East Indies c iv il servant and (later) p ro fe sso r  of 
Eastern E conom ics at Leiden University, J .H .B oek e , who restated 
and elaborated his specia l "du alistic  theory" of under-developed 
areas a few years be fore  his death. It is to be noted that although 
his theory was based la rge ly  on Indonesian experience, Boeke thought 
that it had general application. He form ally  defines a dual society  
thus :
"S ocia l dualism  is the clashing o f an im ported soc ia l system  
with an indigenous socia l system  o f another sty le . M ore frequently 
the im ported socia l system  is high capitalism . But it m ay be s o c ia ­
lism  or com m unism  just as w ell, or a blending of th e m ."  (^)
(1) A .O . H irschm an, op. c it ., p. 125.
(2) J .H . Boeke, E conom ics and E conom ic P o licy  o f Dual Societies 
(New Y ork , 1953), p. 4.
4This dualism , he says, is a "fo rm  of disintegration /w h ich /cam e 
into existence with the appearance o f capitalism  in pre -ca p ita listic  
cou n tries ;" ^  and he goes on to say that " . .  . i t  is to be hoped that 
with the obtaining o f national sovereignty the true character of 
econom ic dualism  w ill be acknowledged s in cere ly  and log ica lly , for 
its negation is decidedly not to the interest of the sm all man. "  ^
A dual econom y has severa l ch aracteristic  features. One of 
these, according to Boeke, is "lim ited needs, "  in sharp contrast 
with the "unlim ited needs" o f a W estern society . Thus, " . .  .anyone 
expecting w estern reactions w ill m eet with frequent su rp rises . 
When the p rice  o f coconut is high, the chances are that less  o f the 
com m odities w ill be offered  for sale; when wages are ra ised  the 
m anager o f the estate risks that less work w ill be done; if three 
a cres are enough to supply the needs of the household, a cultivator 
w ill not till six ; when rubber prices fall the owner of a grove may 
decide to tap m ore intensively, whereas high p rices  m ay mean 
that he leaves a larger or sm all portion of his tappable trees un­
tapped. "  (3)
In other w ords, the Eastern econom y, in contrast to the 
W estern, is characterised  by  backw ard-sloping supply curves of 
e ffort and o f risk-taking. Boeke noted a lso the alm ost com plete 
absence o f profit seeking and o f entrepreneurship in an Eastern 
society  (industry is characterised  by "aversion  to capital" in the 
sense o f a "con sciou s dislike of investing capital and of the risks 
attending th is"); and, because of the big d ifferences involved, held 
that W estern econom ic theory was totally inapplicable to under­
developed a rea s. He was particu larly  cr it ica l of any attempt to 
explain the allocation of resou rces  or the distribution o f incom e 
in term s o f the m arginal productivity theory, m ainly because of 
the considerable im m obility o f resou rces in an econ om ica lly  back ­
ward society .
(1) Boeke, "T hree F orm s o f Disintegration in Dual Societies, " 
Indonesia, V o l.V ii . (1954), p .282
(2) Boeke, E conom ics and E conom ic P o licy  o f Dual Societies,
p. 20.
(3) Ibid., p .40
5This view of the nature of under-developed areas led Boeke to 
p essim istic  conclusions on p o licy . The kindest thing to do is to leave 
the under-developed areas alone. "W e shall have to accept dualism  
as an irretrievab le  fact, "  he says. And the acceptance o f it leads 
to two p o licy  conclusions: " f ir s t  that as a rule one po licy  for  the 
whole country is not possib le , and second that what is ben eficia l for 
one section  o f society  m ay be harm ful for  the o th e r ."  (2)
What can one say in a few words about this theory? C learly , 
there can be no question as to the phenomenon o f dualism . It is one 
o f the distinguishing features o f under-developed countries. N early 
all o f them have two c learly  differentiated sectors  : what Arthur 
Lewis has called a "cap ita list" sector  and a "su bsisten ce" s e c to r . 
"The capitalist sector  is that part o f the econom y which uses r e ­
producible capital, and pays capitalists for  the use th e re o f ."  (This 
coincides with Sm ith's definition o f productive w ork ers , who are 
those who work with capital and whose product can therefore be sold 
at a p rice  above their w a g e s )" . . .  The subsistence sector  is by  d if­
ference all that part o f the econom y which is not using reproducible 
ca p ita l."  (3) Output per head is low er here because " it  is not 
fructified  by ca p ita l."  Lewis goes on to talk of an island or islands 
o f expanding capitalist em ploym ent surrounded by a vast sea o f sub­
sistence w ork ers .
But, if the phenomenon of dualism  is w idely accepted, B oeke 's  
explanation o f it is not. Higgins epitom ises m uch of the cr it ic ism  
when he says that "He (Boeke) thought it had to do with the nature of 
the society , if not actually o f the people them selves, /w h e re a s / 
dualism  is m ore  readily explained in econ om ic and technological 
term s; and this explanation withstands scrutiny better than B oeke 's  
soc io log ica l explanation .11 (4)
(1) Boeke, "T hree F orm s o f D isintegration in Dual S ocie ties" , p. 289
(2) Ib id ., p .2 8 9 .
(3) W. Arthur L ew is, "E con om ic Developm ent with Unlimited Supplies 
of L abou r", The M anchester School of E conom ic and Social Studies, 
May, 1954, pp. 146/7 .
(4) Benjam in Higgins, E conom ic Developm ent (Norton, New York, 1959),
p . 281.
6It is to be hoped that that is so fo r , i f  Boeke w ere right, all our 
e fforts to produce a tak e-off into sustained growth in under­
developed countries through rigorous developm ent program m es 
would be doom ed to fa ilure.
In sum, the explanation of "technologica l dualism ", which is 
claim ed to be borne out by the actual experience o f the past, runs 
something like th is: Assum e an econom ica lly  backward country 
into which industrial investment o f one kind or another is introduced, 
but which does not typically  provide opportunities for  the productive 
em ploym ent o f  the whole population. There are then two sectors , 
an industrial (e. g . plantations, m ines, o il-f ie ld s , re fin eries , e tc ., ) 
and a rural sector  engaged m ainly in producing foodstuffs and sim ple 
handicrafts. The firs t  sector is capital-intensive and is ch arac­
terised  by  relatively  fixed technical coefficients o f production (i. e . 
fixed proportions in which factors o f production m ust be com bined), 
or is assum ed by entrepreneurs to be so . The other sector has 
variable technical coefficien ts, that is , the products can be produced 
with a wide range o f factor proportions. The two factors are labour, 
on the one hand, and capital (including im proved land), on the other.
The industrialisation generates a population explosion  but, 
because of the actual or accepted fixed technical coefficien ts in the 
industrial sector , em ploym ent opportunities do not occur at the same 
rate as the growth of population. So far from  bringing a shift of 
population to the industrial sector , apart from  the relatively  sh ort- 
run im pact, industrialisation m ay even bring a relative decline in 
the proportion  o f total em ploym ent in that se c to r . Thus m ore 
people have to seek a livelihood in the m ore prim itive sector .
Technical coefficien ts being variable, production in that sector  
becom es increasingly  labour-intensive until a point is reached where 
all available land is cultivated and the m arginal productivity o f labour 
falls below zero  even with the m ost labour-intensive techniques 
available. As population in crea ses , so disguised unemployment sets 
in. And the net e ffect tends to be to widen p rog ressiv e ly  the disparity  
in the living standards o f the two se cto rs .
The tendency towards disguised unemployment in the rural sector 
is enhanced with every technological advance that takes a form favouring 
the capital-intensive sector. It is further enhanced, one m ay point 
out, if wage rates are kept artificially high by trade union activities or 
by government policy. Industrial wage rates which are high relative 
to productivity provide an incentive for the introduction of labour- 
saving devices and consequently diminish still further the capacity of 
the industrial sector to absorb the population growth.
7A study of under-developed countries revea ls that the proportion  
of the total labour force  working on the land is virtually a m easure of 
the degree o f under-developm ent. If it is true that techniques are 
usually advanced and productivity high in the industrial se cto r , but 
labour-in tensive, sim ple and with abysm ally low productivity in the 
rural sector , why does labour not shift m ore  than it does from  the 
latter to the form er, as econ om ic theory would suggest? And why 
does industrial capital not flow into agricu lture? A fter a ll, a ccording 
to orthodox theory the m arginal productivity o f capital ought to be 
higher in the rural sector , where the ratio o f labour to capital is 
high, than in the industrial se c to r , where it is low .
This is perhaps the m ost v icious o f a ll the v icious c irc le s  
encountered in the study o f under-developm ent. Labour does not flow 
into the industrial sector  faster than it does because the supply of 
capital there is lim ited and because technical coefficien ts are fixed, 
or thought to be so . And the supply o f d om estic  capital to the rural 
sector  is a lso  lim ited . It is not d irected  towards im proving techniques 
because, although the elasticity  of substitution o f labour fo r  capital 
m ay be high, that of capital for land is low . R elatively sm all amounts 
o f investm ent in tools, irrigation  or fe rtiliz ers  could bring the 
m arginal productivity o f capital down to zero , given the prevailing 
ratio o f labour to land.
In such circum stances it seem s quite clear that the only way to 
overcom e the redundancy of labour in the undeveloped sector  is to 
increase the supply of the scarce  factor -  capital. But it is w ell to 
bear in mind, at the same tim e, that the im m ediately sca rce  factor 
is land. The only way to ra ise  the m arginal productivity of capital 
is to in crease  the ratio of land to labour, and substantially so . The 
average fam ily landholding w ill have to be in creased  to a point where 
m echanisation becom es econom ic if capital’ s m arginal product is to 
be raised to any significant extent. With high population densities 
this can be achieved only by inducing people to leave the land fo r  the 
industrial se c to r . And for  any such program m e capital once m ore 
becom es the scarce  fa cto r . Heavy investments in both the industrial 
and the agrarian sectors  are required. Neither agricultural re form  
of the backward sector  nor industrialisation w ill, by itse lf, break 
through this particular v icious c ir c le . When countries are in the 
sort of situation envisaged h ere , only a carefu lly  co-ord inated  la rg e - 
scale developm ent program m e on both fronts can hope to launch them 
on a course o f cumulative betterm ent for a ll.
8Now, this is all very  w ell, you m ight say, but suppose we do 
not accept the kind o f technological dualism  just presented. Suppose, 
for exam ple, we re je ct  the idea of a population explosion  following 
upon capital investment in the under-developed econom y. In that 
case let us exam ine, albeit b rie fly , and a lm ost inevitably in a som e­
what over-s im p lified  m anner, another variant of the econom ic 
dualism  thesis, that made famous by  Arthur Lew is ^  alm ost a 
decade ago, and see what its policy  im plications amount to.
This m odel postulates a subsistence econom y in which there 
are, from  the start, unlimited supplies o f labour. (Skilled labour 
m a y b e  a tem porary bottle -neck , but the capitalists w ill soon 
enough train w orkers to the required degree o f  sk ill). Capital 
investment is introduced, so that henceforth the econom y is in two 
parts, capitalist and subsistence. The capitalist enclave w ill be 
able to obtain its labour from  the other sector  by paying a wage a 
little above the conventional ieve l o f subsistence or , m ore  probably, 
a little above the average product o f the w orker on the land. Labour 
being unlimited, an expanding capitalist sector  w ill recru it m ore  
and m ore  labour without having to ra ise w ages. Instead, the e ffect 
w ill be to ra ise  the share o f profits in the national incom e.
This p rocess  w ill continue until the cap ita list sector  has 
grown to a size such that it has drawn o ff all the "su rp lu s" labour 
from  the land (i. e . "capital form ation  has caught up with population"). 
A fter that, additional labour requirem ents now for  the firs t  time 
having to be m et from  a lim ited supply, rea l wage rates in the capita­
lis t sector  w ill tend to r ise  above the subsistence leve l. Other things 
being equal, this w ill reduce the rate of capital accum ulation and 
eventually set a lim it to the capitalist se c to r .
(1) W. Arthur Lew is, op. c it., pp. 139-191; a lso  "Unlimited Labour: 
Further N otes", The M anchester School, June, 1958. P ro fe sso r  
Stephen Enke, h im se lf no mean p erform er in this field (See e .g .  
his "E con om ic Developm ent with Unlimited and Lim ited Supplies 
of Labour, "  in Oxford E conom ic P apers, June 1962) says of 
L ew is 's  1954 contribution that it is "am ong the m ost important 
articles  on econom ic developm ent to have appeared during the 
past d e ca d e ,"
9The best way to fo rce  up rea l wages in the capitalist sector  is 
to raise the productivity of the subsistence sector  (average product 
per head). And the best way to achieve this is by  m ore econom ic 
land apportionm ent and m echanisation. This calls for capital fo r  
the subsistence sector , just as the reduction of the capitalist "su rp lu s" 
consequent upon the raising o f wages ca lls  for further capital in the 
industrial sector , if the rate of manufacturing output is to be m ain­
tained.
C learly , i f  the capitalist sector  is dependent on the subsistence 
sector  for food, the fo rm e r 's  expansion w ill in crease  the demand 
for  food and, unless the supply is correspondingly  in creased , food 
prices  w ill r ise  in term s o f m anufactured products, thus reducing 
the rate of capital accum ulation. This is one o f the senses in which 
industrialisation is dependent upon agricultural re fo rm .
Once again, then, if living standards are to r ise  all round, 
the two sectors  m ust develop together. W hilst to say that, is to state 
the problem  in basic  term s it is , nevertheless, no m ore than a general 
prescrip tion  for econom ic advancem ent. Of the many detailed and 
sp ecific  aspects to any developm ent program m e none is perhaps m ore 
important or m ore topica l than the strategies related to the soca lled  
"k ey" groups in a given society .
"K ey" Groups in Developm ent Strategies.
P articu lar groups in society  -  technicians, trade unionists, 
adm inistrators, the "e lite " , entrepreneurs and innovators -  have 
been as prom inent in d iscussions of the strategy of econom ic develop ­
ment as have general politica l and socia l fa cto rs ' and recent develop ­
ment proposals have tended to assign som e o f these groups a prim ary  
p lace .
The early  post-w ar d iscussions stressed  the role o f technicians 
(it was at this time that the term  "technical a ssistan ce" was coined). 
Important as they are, it seem s that the em phasis on the ro le  of 
technicians has dim inished with tim e, as countries have found it 
possib le  to train lo ca l m ateria l and to im port technical com petence as 
long as there are no politica l obsta cles . Another group that has had 
som e vogue as a big elem ent in developm ent -  ch iefly, perhaps, 
among politica l scientists -  has been the elite o f under-developed 
countries. The attitudes, background and influence of this group have 
at tim es been regarded as cru cia l. E conom ists, in turn, have tended 
to favour analyses em phasising the key im portance of entrepreneurs -  
their num ber, m otivation and position  in society .
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Lately there have been attempts to pin down in m ore sp ecific  
term s the ro le  of som e o f these groups, the reasons why they are 
cru cia l, and the causes for  their behaviour.
Thus, E verett Hagen ^  highlights the innovators as did 
Schumpeter before  him . Others, like M cClelland, ^  have been 
accum ulating considerable evidence on the relationship between 
ch ild -rearing  p ra ctices , the adult personality, the nature and 
strength o f its m otivations, and their significance for  entrepreneu­
ria l behaviour and the rate of econ om ic growth. But perhaps the 
only com pleted recent work in this field that m akes sp ecific  r e co m ­
mentations on developm ent strategy and cr iteria  is P ro fe sso r  
H irschm an’ s "The Strategy of E conom ic D evelopm ent."
H irschm an argues that the ability to make developm ent decisions 
is the sca rce  resou rce  that conditions all other sca rc ities  and d iff i­
cu lties . The appropriate strategy for  developm ent,, therefore , is one 
that m axim ises "routine" decision-m aking and "induced" d ecis ion ­
m aking. Investment that com pels other investment, p ro jects  that 
require decisions on other p ro jects , would have the highest p riority . 
Thus it is wrong to say that investment should not be concentrated 
in urban areas, which require m ore investment than rural areas 
fo r  housing, water, sew erage, and the lik e . On the con tra ry , the 
very  fact that investment in urban areas requires further investm ent 
in overhead facilities  is one of the strongest arguments in its favour. 
H irschm an argues for what he ca lls  "unbalanced growth" in the shape 
o f  a conscious p o licy  o f developing some lines faster or ea rlie r  than 
others in order to induce decisions that w ill in turn develop suppliers 
and u sers .
With these issues in mind let us now turn to the situation 
prevailing in South A frica .
(1) Everett E .H agen, "The A llocation  of Investment in Under­
developed Countries ; Observations Based on the Experience 
o f B urm a", in Investment C riteria  and E conom ic Growth 
(Cam bridge, M .I . T . Center for  International Studies, 1955).
(2) David C . M cClelland, "Som e Social Consequences of A ch ieve­
m ent M otivation", Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 
(L incoln, U niversity of Nebraska P re ss , 1955).
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The Case o f South A fr ica .
South A fr ica  is an alm ost c la ss ic  exam ple o f a dual econom y, 
in which a highly m echanised industrial sector  and a backward 
subsistence sector  ex ist side by side. The great stimulus to the 
industrial revolution  in this country was the d iscov ery  of diamonds 
and gold in the 1870's and 1880's. P r ior  to that South A fr ica  was 
predom inantly an agricultural and pastoral com m unity. The bulk 
o f its indigenous A frican  population clung to a prim itive m ode o f 
life in which superstition was rife  and poverty, as judged by 'm odern  
W estern standards, w idespread.
Into this environm ent, with its abundant supplies of unskilled 
labour, but much less capital, there was suddenly implanted a highly 
capital-using industry requiring a re latively  sm all quantity o f  labour 
per unit value of output, and a large proportion  of which required to 
be sk illed . The inevitable consequence was a large inflow o f foreign  
capital and the im portation o f trained European labour at European 
wage ra tes . On the other hand, the wages of the unskilled labour 
em ployed w ere predom inantly determ ined by  lo ca l labour conditions.
In this sense and to this extent, the dual econom y which em erged 
m ay be said to have been created by the ordinary workings of a com ­
petitive p rice  system .
It is perhaps o f som e interest that today, some 80 years later, 
mining (particu larly  gold-m ining) is still expanding v igorou sly ; and 
it is still probably the b iggest developm ent stimulus to the whole 
econom y, even if it has had to give way, since the last w ar, to manu­
facturing industry (iust as agriculture had had to yield to mining in 
the early  th irties) as the principal "con tributor”  to the national incom e. 
A ffording em ploym ent to m ore  than 600, 000 persons at the present 
tim e, the mining industry is by far our b iggest earner of foreign  
exchange, the export o f gold and diamonds alone running at m ore  than 
R600 m illions a year.
But as the p rocess  of industrialisation has grown apace, so 
have the com plications which seem  to go with econom ic dualism  been 
aggravated, in South A fr ica 's  case, by the m u lti-ra c ia l character of 
her society  and the restriction ism  which has becom e so inseparable 
a ch aracteristic  of it.
The ra cia l structure of the population is of particular im portance 
to the prospects for  econ om ic growth fo r  a ll in South A frica , not only 
because o f the declared apartheid or "separate developm ent" p o licy  
o f governm ent, but a lso  but a lso  because many o f the m ost fundamental 
d ifferences among persons are accentuated on ra cia l lin es . F or instance,
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while many exceptions m ay be found to prove the rule, it is generally  
true that, for many reasons (not all as sim ple as they m ight seem ), 
the country has inherited a form  o f socie ty  in which m ost o f the 
sk illed , educated and w ell-paid  w orkers are white, and where m ost of 
the less skilled, p oorly  educated and badly paid w orkers are black  or 
co loured . This divergence o f purchasing pow er on a racia l basis leads 
in turn to m arked differences in levels o f nutrition, health, housing 
and general standards o f  liv ing.
A ccord ing  to the latest Census there w ere, in I960, 15.8 
m illion  people o f all races in this country, o f whom just over 3 
m illion  (few er than 20 percent) w ere White, about 1, 5 m illion  
(9 percent) Coloured, alm ost j  m illion  (all but 3 percent) A sia tic  and 
close  on 11 m illion  (68 percent) A frican . In the last fifty years or so 
the population of all ra ces  has increased at the compounded rate of 
2 .1  per cent per annum; that of Whites by 1 .8  percent; o f Coloureds 
by 2 .2  percent; o f A siatics by 2 ,7  percent; and of A fricans by 2.1 
percent. Despite the disparate rates of in crea se , the racia l d is tr i­
bution o f the population, taken percentage-w ise , has rem ained 
rem arkably constant since the date of Union -  the main reason  being 
that the group whose "row th rate is furthest from  the average (the 
A sia tic) is num erica lly  the sm allest.
South A fr ica  covers an area of 472, 000 square m iles , so that 
the average density o f settlem ent is only 33 persons per square m ile . 
On the other hand, one-fifth  o f the total population (and tw o-fifths of 
the White population) reside in the five la rgest towns.
The urbanisation that has taken place over the years is a 
notable ch aracteristic  of the population and o ffic ia l statistics reveal 
quite c lea rly  that the urbanisation rate o f the A frican  has outstripped 
that of any other ra ce . W here, in 1911, there w ere approxim ately 
half a m illion  A fricans in the urban areas, the number had increased 
to som e 3 -l/3 rd  m illions by  I960. Where fifty  years ago but one in 
every  8 A fricans resided in the m etropolitan areas, today 3 in every  
10 do so . During the latest in ter-cen sa l period  (1951-1960) there 
was a b igger increase in the urban A frican  population than in any 
sim ilar period  in the past. What is m ore , a sample survey just 
com pleted by the Council for Scientific and Industrial R esearch  
reveals that 70 percent o f urban A fricans are industrialised w orkers 
who have never reverted to rural w ork . In truth, the A frican  in our 
c ities has com e to stay, and his num bers are increasing steadily 
from  year to year.
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In. the absence of o ffic ia l statistics, the best estim ate I can 
make o f the geographical distribution o f the A frican  population is 
that som e 4 j  m illions (just over 40 percent) are in the Native 
R eserve te rr ito r ie s , 3 - l /3 r d  m illions (30 percent) in the urban 
areas (of whom som e half a m illion  are m igrant w orkers dom iciled  
in the R eserv es), and the rest, a little over 3 m illions (som ewhat 
less  than 30 percent), on European farm s and in other rural areas.
W hilst it is true that the rate of developm ent for the econom y 
as a whole has been quite rem arkable ever since the turn of the 
century, '  ' it is equally true that, for one thing, the greater part 
o f the population has had a v ery  sm all share in this advancement 
and, fo r  another, that, for  the f ir s t  time since o ffic ia l statistics 
have been  available, rea l incom e per head actually fe ll a fter 1957, 
Even now, the gradual upturn that has subsequently set in has done 
little m ore  than restore  the figure to its 1957 leve l.
With the paucity o f o ffic ia l statistics on the point, we have to 
look where we can fo r  inform ation o f the d ifferential earnings o f the 
m ajor groups in our socie ty .
As far as the R eserves are concerned -  where 30 p er  cent of 
the population lives on 13 percent of the country 's land surface - 
the Tom linson C om m ission   ^  ^ estim ated the average value o f a g r i­
cultural output at R44 per fam ily  (of 6 persons) per year, and 
found that this was supplemented by  an alm ost equal amount o f R42 
per year from  other work done in the area . The sam e source 
estim ated the norm al grain requirem ents o f an A frican  fam ily  of 
s ix  persons at 15 bags a year, but found that the total crop  accruing 
to it w as, on the average, not even half that figu re . On this and 
other evidence it  is quite c lear  that the R eserves constitute a sub­
sistence econom y (even sub-subsistence, fo r  som e. )
(1) Since 1910 there has been a 6 -fo ld  in crease  in the value o f gross 
national production (at constant p r ice s ) and a m ore than doubling 
of per capita rea l in com es. Today the average incom e per head 
of the whole population is  roughly R290 per annum (or R267 if 
allowance is made fo r  payments to non-South A frican  fa cto rs ). 
While this is much low er than in m ost W estern countries, it r e ­
presents a standard o f living higher than in the rest o f A fr ica .
(2) Summary o f the R eport o f the C om m ission  for  the S ocio -E con om ic  
Developm ent o f the Bantu A reas within the Union o f South A fr ica , 
U. G. 61/1955, pp. 35 and 98.
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Of the 3 m illion  A fricans on European farm s and in other rural 
areas outside the R eserves , it is estim ated that about one-half are 
actively  engaged in farm  w ork, som e 720, 000 as regular farm  labou­
re rs , 670, 000 as casual and seasonal w orkers and 125, 000 as 
dom estic servants. (1) This means that fu lly 40 percent of all e c o ­
nom ically  active A fricans are engaged in agricultural persuits 
outside the R eserv es ; and this com pares with the United States and 
som e advanced European countries, where 10 percent and even 
few er of the population is thus engaged.
Concern has recently  been expressed  by an o ffic ia l C om m ission  
of Enquiry at the decline o f the rural European population and the 
increasing preponderance o f A fricans on European farm s.
F rom  sample surveys conducted in the southern F ree State and 
northern Natal, for instance, about 25 per cent and 83 percent 
resp ective ly  of the farm s were found to be occupied exclusively  by 
A fricans (among the reasons given for  this state o f affairs are too 
sm all farm  units; the la rg e -s ca le  acquisition o f land by a relatively  
few wealthy individuals -  about 3 percent of the European farm ers 
are said to own at least one-third of South A fr ica ’ s farm  land; 
exorbitant land p r ice s ; and the com paratively high leve l o f working 
capital required).
A ccord ing  to recent estim ates of the D ivision  of E conom ics 
and Markets of the Department of A gricu lture, incom es of A frican  
farm  w orkers -  both in cash and in kind - range from  R82 per annum 
in the north-w estern  Transvaal bushveld to R144 per annum in the 
W estern Transvaal. Cash wages of regular A frican  farm  labourers 
norm ally com prise from  40 to 50 percent of aggregate earnings and 
are estim ated, on the average, at a little over R60 per w orker per 
annum. As regards fam ily incom e, the o ffic ia l estim ate fo r  the 
central F ree  State was an average of R352 per annum. In the Eastern 
Cape, reputedly a relatively  low -w age farm ing area, the annual 
incom e o f a farm  labou rer 's  fam ily was found in 1958 to average 
about R214 per year, W  in cash and kind.
(1) Data for  1959, supplied by the Bureau o f Census and Statistics, 
P retor ia .
(2) R eport of the C om m ission  of Enquiry into European Occupancy of 
the Rural A reas, (Government P rinter, P retoria , 1959).
(3) Quoted by S. J .du T oit:"A frican  Farm  L abour": Race Relations 
Journal, V ol. XXVI, No. 2. A pril-June, 1959. Pages 77 -78 .
(4) M argaret R oberts, Labour in the Farm  Econom y (South A frican  
Institute o f Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1959) p. 62.
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F or m ost o f those a lso -who have chosen to m ove to the urban 
areas, living standards are far from  enviable. Recent incom e and 
fam ily budget studies of A fricans in the Durban area d isc lose  that 
2 out o f every  5 fam ilies earn less, than R28 a month and 7 out of 
every  10 less than R37 a m on th .' The average fam ily  (of five 
persons) has a regular wage incom e o f R34 a month, a figure which, 
fo r  the vast m a jority  o f them, falls w oefully short o f their m inim um  
recorded  expenditure r e q u ir e m e n ts .^
•
The sam e sort o f situation is , by and large, revealed  by incom e 
surveys conducted elsew here (notably those o f the Institute o f Race 
Relations for  the Johannesburg area, Rhodes University, the P retor ia  
Bureau of Market R esearch , and one or two m unicipal investigations)- 
even if, for reasons which are not im m ediately apparent, the leve l o f 
earnings o f the P retoria  study is com paratively  high. P )
A useful rough com parison  with European earnings is provided 
by the o ffic ia l survey o f (White) fam ily incom e and expenditures made 
in 1955 fo r  the purpose o f rev ising  the reta il p rice  index, and e m ­
bracing the ten principal urban areas o f the country. A ccord ing  
to this, the average incom e in that year from  all sou rces per E u ro ­
pean fam ily was R2770, and from  sa laries and wages R2646.
On the basis of these and other data (such as Wage B oard d eter­
minations and Industrial Census reports), it  m ight reasonably be 
concluded that the wages o f Whites are from  five to six  tim es greater 
than fo r  non-W hites at this tim e.
(1) Department o f E conom ics o f the U niversity o f Natal. (As yet 
unpublished report. )
(2) Ibid.
(3) For instance, though unskilled wage rates are very  sim ila r in 
Durban and P retoria , average fam ily  incom es apparently d iffer 
by as much as R 151 per annum (R404 per annum in the Durban 
enquiry and R555 in the P retoria  enquiry).
(4) Bureau o f Census and Statistics: Survey o f Fam ily  Expenditure- 
N ovem ber, 1955. R eport No. 3 : Incom e: Page 13. Government 
P rin ter, P retoria , D ecem ber, 1957.
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Thus, after three generations o f active industrialisation in this 
country the inequality o f incom es among Whites and non-W hites is 
apparently as great as ever  it w as; and the persistently  low earning 
capacity o f the greater m ajority  o f the population is  at once the m ost 
intractable problem  facing those who would wish to see the raising of 
living standards on a country-w ide basis .
P art of the explanation for  this state o f a ffa irs lies in the big 
d ifferences in the skills and the occupations of the racia l groups. 
Appendix 11, based on the 1951 population census indicates these 
d ifferen ces.
Yet these figures are them selves sym ptom s rather than causes. 
The causes lie deeper and inhere in our custom s and conventions, 
ideo log ies, race  attitudes, and politica l, socia l and econ om ic institu­
tions. The essentia lly  econom ic character of the dualism  that em erged 
with the industrial revolution in South A fr ica  has been changed funda­
m entally, and the change itse lf bolstered  and extrenched by a plethora 
o f legislative and other restr iction s . These m easures, operating 
m ainly against the freedom  of the individual, and becom ing m ore 
numerous each year, must be viewed as a drastic departure from  
la is se z -fa ire  princip les and a serious encum brance upon the m obility  
o f the factors of production, notably labour.
P r io r  to 1956 very  few statutory enactments discrim inated 
among w orkers on racia l lines, although a de facto colour bar had 
arisen  in m ost fields o f em ploym ent as a resu lt of socia l custom  and 
the strength of the European labour unions. It is true that an
insidious type o f discrim ination  was discern ib le  in the fact that 
A fricans were excluded, by definition, from  the provisions of certain 
A cts dealing with labour m atters, but it was not until the passing o f 
the Industrial Conciliation A ct of 1956 that "job  reservation " was 
introduced as an o ffic ia l p o licy .
The princip le itse lf seem s to rest on a fallacious view o f the 
econom ic im plications o f increasing em ploym ent of non-W hites 
(notably A fricans) in the industrial econom y. F ar from  lim iting the 
em ploym ent opportunities of Whites, the availability of suitable non- 
White labour has in the past been a pre-con d ition  for the overall 
expansion o f industrial em ploym ent and output.
(1) The ea rliest A ct embodying a legal co lour bar in South A fr ica  was 
the Mines and W orks A ct of 19 H i as amended by A ct.N o.26 of 1926.
(2) See O. P .F .H orw ood , et al, "The Em ploym ent Provided by Manufac­
turing Industry", in South A frican  Industry and Trade (Union 
Jubilee Issue), M arch, I960, p. 95, where "four m ain w ays" in 
which this has happened are indicated.
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The occupational and geographical m obility  o f labour has been 
further curtailed by restriction s on the physical m ovem ent o f persons 
and w ork ers , m ainly through the operations o f the Group A reas A ct, 
the various "pass law s" and, sp ecifica lly , by "influx con tro l" of 
A fricans and, for  Indians, the very  severe restriction s im posed by 
statute on their in ter-prov in cia l m ovem ent.
Influx control has its ostensible justification  as a m eans of 
controlling the m ovem ent o f A fricans from  the farm s and the R eserves  
in to the urban areas and thus avoiding som e of the evils o f o v e r ­
crowding, slum  form ation, unemployment, and human m ise ry  which 
might otherwise ensue. Today,how ever, except for  the sm all, but 
growing proportion  of A fricans who w ere born  in an urban area and 
those who have worked there for  a considerable tim e, the tem porary  
residence o f A fricans in a town is a priv ilege and not a right, and 
the refusal to accept what em ploym ent is o ffered  to them by the 
labour bureaux, or an unsatisfactory h istory  of unstable em ploym ent, 
m ay resu lt in their being endorsed out o f  the area. This would 
perm anently debar an A frican  from  re -en terin g  the area; nor m ight 
he be able to obtain perm iss ion  to seek work anywhere e ls e . This 
power to withhold from  a w orker the right to sell his labour in the 
best m arket’, and which in som e cases denies him the right to se ll it 
at all, m ust be unique in a D em ocratic country except in tim es of 
hostility .
It is well-know n that A fricans are debarred from  the provisions 
o f the Industrial Conciliation A ct (Industrial conciliation  fo r  A fricans 
is covered by the Native Labour (Settlement o f D isputes) A ct o f 1953) 
and that any unions they m ay form  are not o ffic ia lly  recogn ised  and 
usually operate under extrem e difficulty . O fficia lly , then, A fricans 
have no d irect say as an organised group in the determ ination o f their 
conditions o f em ploym ent.
If the foregoing analysis has any m erit  it follow s that the sub­
sistence  econom y in South A fr ica  is not, as is often averred , con ­
fined to the Native R eserve terr ito ries , but that it extends appreciab ly  
into the m odern, industrial sector  as w ell. And any proposals for 
the raising o f l iv in g  standards o f  all sections o f the population m ust 
take cognisance o f that fact.
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate (even i f  in outline only) 
the blueprint o f a strategy o f econom ic developm ent fo r  this country.
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In a w ord, the first essentia l is a d rastic  reduction o f the 
restriction ism  which so severly  "c ir cu m scr ib es  . . .  our growing 
v irtu es"; and the second is the uplift of the subsistence economy- 
on a sound, lon g -term  footing. The raising o f the average product 
o f those in the R eserves by im proved farm ing methods and m echani­
sation w ill not only alleviate the poverty of their own inhabitants, but 
the ben eficia l effects w ill spread to those outside the R eserv es , on 
European farm s and in the urban areas. F or  better living conditions 
in the R eserves w ill fo rce  em ployers everyw here to pay higher wages 
in order to induce the (now better off) A fricans to leave the land.
But this, in turn, requ ires the maintenance of a rate o f growth 
in the industrial econom y adequate to absorb those who, in tim e, w ill 
be d isp laced from  the land by the program m e of agricultural im prove­
m ent. This continued growth o f industry is a considerable prov iso  
fo r , with the virtual cessation , on balance, o f foreign  investm ent in 
South A fr ica , capital is extrem ely  sca rce . F or this and other 
reasons, it seem s inevitable that m ore land w ill have to be made 
available to A fricans. Thus the situation arises that to extinguish 
the m ain part of the subsistence econom y, as represented by  the 
R eserves , it w ill be n ecessa ry  to extend their area.
In addition, as the Tom linson C om m ission  (among others) 
pointed out, there is a great need for re form  of the land tenure system . 
The su rest way, it seem s to m e, to give a man a real incentive to 
im prove his position is to give him a stake in the ownership of 
property, above all o f land. ^
It requ ires but to say that the econom ic developm ent proposals 
envisaged here d iffer in substantial respects  from  those contained in 
the Governm ent's recently-announced fiv e -y ea r  R 114 m illion  plan
(1) F or instance, the net investment rate (the ratio of net capital 
form ation  to net national product) which for  many years after 
the last war was above 20 percent -  and at tim es as high as 23 
and 24 percent -  is down to no m ore than 13 percent today.
(2) This is one resp ect in which I must disagree with P ro fe sso r  
Hobart Houghton's adm irable d iscussion  o f the econom ic 
developm ent o f the R eserv es . (D .H obart Houghton "E con om ic 
Developm ent of the R e se rv e s " ; Race Relations Journal,
V o l. XXIX Jan. -M arch , 1962, Page 14. )
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for the Bantustans.  ^ Much bigger sums w ill have to be spent on 
agricu ltural re form  in the R eserv es , since m ore food is the greatest 
and m ost pressing need. M oreover, i f  the whole program m e is to be 
on the sca le  o f the "big push" that seem s so n ecessa ry  to its su ccess , 
the "bord er a rea s" industrialisation schem e w ill surely  have to make 
way for one which allows industrialists to choose their own sites, 
whether within, on the perim eter of, or outside the R eserv es .
The words with which Paul Sam uelson concluded a chapter on 
the econom ic developm ent o f the fanciful country alertia  seem  
pecu liarly  appropriate to the dom estic scene: "A ll in all, to the 
visiting anthropologist and econom ist South A fr ica  presents a fa s ­
cinating sp ectacle . N o-one knows quite where she is going. But 
this m uch is clear -  she is on her w a y ."
(1) As it stands, fully tw o-thirds of the R 114-m illion aggregate is 
earm arked fo r  Bantu housing and v illages (m ost o f them 
apparently designed to supply labour to the hoped -for White 
"b o rd e r "  industries); leaving sca rce ly  one-third o f the total 
for the productive developm ent of the R eserves them selves.
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APPENDIX 1. N um ber Index
Population of South A fr ica 1910 5, 878, 000 100
1960 1 5 ,841 ,000 269
Urban population 1921 1,934, 000 100
1960 6 ,970 , 000 360
G ross National Income 1911/12 R 736 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1960/61 4,544 617
P er capita incom e 1911/12 R 122 100
(at 1958 p r ice s ) 1960/61 R 284 233
Em ploym ent on farm s 1918 488,062 100
(excluding A frican  farm s) 1958 961,769 197
Em ploym ent on m ines 1910 291, 377 100
1961 610,000 209
Em ploym ent on South A frican  Railways 1910 52, 595 100
1961 214, 500 408
Em ploym ent in manufacturing and 1915/16 97,020 100
construction  industries 1961 794, 800 819
Net output o f manufacturing industries 1915/16 R 70 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1959/60 R 1, 014 1,449
E lectric ity  generated (KWH m illions) 1916/17 942 100
1961 24, 556 2,607
C om m ercia l bank deposits 1913 R 190 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1961 R l, 133 596
Total governm ent revenue 1911/12 R 78 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1960/61 R 710 910
Total im ports 1910 R 190 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1961 R 985 518
Total exports 1910 R 290 (61% gold) 100
(R m illion  at 1958 p r ice s ) 1961 R l, 450 (38% gold) 500
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APPENDIX II.
Occupational D istribution o f E conom ica lly  Active 
________ Population o f South A f r ica , 1951.
White Coloured A siatic Bantu 
To jo  jo  j r
P rofess ion a l and Technical 9 .7 2 .0 2 .8 0.9
Adm inistrative and M anagerial 8 .0 0 .4 1 0.7 0 .2
C lerica l W orkers 20 .2 1.3 3 .2 0 .4
Sales W orkers 6 .5 1.6 1 2 .4 0 .4
A griculture and fishing 14.6 29.1 1 3 .7 46 .2
Mining 3 .3 0 .8 0 .4 14.1
Transport operating 3 .1 2 .9 4 .1 1.0
Industrial w orkers 27.3 37 .8 3 0 .1 19.3
Service w orkers 4 .7 17.8 1 0 .8 14.6
Other and undefined w orkers 2 .6 6 .3 1 1 .8 2.9
100. 0 100.0 100. 0 100.0
E conom ica lly  A ctive Population 983,568 404, 524 94,481 3 ,1 1 0 ,0 1 4
Total Population 2,641 ,689 1, 103, 016 366,664 8, 560, 083
E conom ica lly  A ctive as % o f 
Total 37 36 26 36
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